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Does federal contracting spur development? 
Federal contracts, income, output, and jobs in US cities 
Michiel Gerritse* and Andrés Rodríguez-Poseև  
* Erasmus University Rotterdam 
ևLondon School of Economics 
Abstract 
Firms and governments alike frequently court federal government contracts to generate more 
jobs and trigger economic growth. However, the employment and output impact of 
government contracts remains controversial. We use georeferenced data on United States 
(US) federal contracts, distinguishing between the location of the recipient and the location of 
the activity, for the years 2005-2014 in order to assess the employment and output impacts of 
federal contracting in metropolitan areas of the US. We resort to a shift-share instrument and 
precise location-specific fixed effects to estimate the causal impact of spending. Cities that 
receive more contract expenditure witness an expansion in output – with contracts generating 
$1.4 per dollar spent – but experience only modest increases in employment. The impact is 
also constrained geographically and short-lived. The results suggest that, on average, the 
effects of federal contracting on local economies are modest, meaning that attracting federal 
contracts may not be an effective urban development strategy. 
Keywords: federal contracting; government spending; jobs; wages; economic growth; urban 
development 
JEL: R11; R38; O23; E62; R58  
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1. Introduction 
In the fiscal year 2016, the US federal government awarded a total of $409,229,751,215 in 
contracts above a $3,000 threshold. These contracts financed essential public goods and 
services required for the economy to operate and for society to function. They were granted 
to firms across the US and were expected to create jobs and stimulate production in recipient 
firms and locations. Presidential economic advisors have viewed federal contracting as a 
development tool: a multiplier of $1.6 in output was expected for every dollar of government 
spending [see the motivation for the 2009 fiscal stimulus package proposed by President 
Obama (Economist, 2009)]. 
However, it was not only firms that pursued government contracts. As federal contracts are 
expected to generate jobs and trigger economic growth, local decision-makers have also 
actively courted them. As a norm, US Senators regularly use their websites to advertise 
successes in securing federal funding for their home states. Yet, the economic development 
impact of these contracts remains shrouded in mystery. The reasons for this are twofold. 
First, the effect of federal contracts on the development of cities and states has attracted 
relatively little interest despite the volume of funds disbursed. Second, the results of research 
examining the geographical impact of federal intervention – through grants, subsidies and, to 
a much lesser extent, contracts – are far from homogenous. In terms of job generation, 
$35,000 has been often quoted as the public expenditure needed to create a new job (Ramey, 
2011). However, the range is vast: from $25,000 to $125,000 (Shoag, 2013; Wilson 2012). 
Similarly, various spatial quantitative analyses have suggested that the multiplier effect 
associated with government contracts may be as low as 0.5 or as high as 2.4 (Nakamura and 
Steinsson, 2014; Fishback and Kachanovskaya, 2010; Clemens and Miran, 2012). 
This paper delves into the economic impact of federal contracts across urban areas in the US 
between 2005 and 2014. It exploits contract-level data to estimate the impact of federal 
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contract spending on urban employment and GDP. The analysis also draws a distinction 
between where, on the one hand, the firm benefitting from the contract is located (recipient 
location) and where, on the other, the activity related to the contract takes place (location of 
the activity). The high granularity of the data collected allows us to go beyond previous 
literature and analyze the impact of national expenditure decisions as an exogenous source of 
variation in local contract expenditure at a city level. Moreover, we are able to control, in a 
more precise way than hitherto, for localized economic circumstances as well as for state-
level political representation. These are factors that may otherwise bias the estimates of the 
GDP and employment impacts of public spending. 
The results of the analysis show that federal contracting is a non-negligible driver of urban 
growth in the US. One dollar of federal contract spending generates close to $1.4 in 
additional GDP. Output and employment increase in cities that benefit from more federal 
contract spending per capita. The employment effects are, however, lower than related 
studies suggest. Output changes are more often realized not in the cities where the contract is 
executed, but rather in those where the recipient firms are established. By contrast, cities 
where the contracts are executed witness moderate increases in employment.  
Overall, our analysis suggests that the economic outcomes associated with federal contracts – 
once reverse causality and spurious trends are controlled for – are small and short-lived. No 
measurable output effects remain in evidence two years after a contract is awarded. Likewise, 
the output effects of federal contracts outside the location of expenditure are virtually 
negligible. 
 
2. Public intervention and wages, jobs, and output 
Government contracting is frequently regarded as a tool for economic development. Firms 
and local decision-makers lobby central or federal governments for contracts. However, the 
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economic impact of public contract expenditure at the regional or urban scale has so far 
attracted limited attention and consequently remains poorly understood, especially in 
relationship to the greater scholarly interest in grants and subsidies.1  
In this paper we explore this question by linking our research to two strands of literature. 
First is the large body of literature estimating the output multipliers and employment impacts 
of fiscal spending. Our contribution to this strand is derived from our measurement of federal 
contract expenditure and our focus on urban outcomes. Second, the paper relates to research 
on the local employment, wage, and production impacts of public policies and to 
geographically targeted policies, such as spatial subsidies or zoning, aimed at attracting firms 
and creating jobs. While the territorial unit of analysis employed here is comparable to such 
studies, we examine a different kind of public spending: federal contracts. These contracts 
cater to public demand and are not motivated by the development of specific areas. They are 
awarded through competitive tenders and generally not targeted to individual firms or areas. 
Importantly, federal contract expenditure in the US is far larger than the budget for location-
specific incentives.  
 
2.1 Spatial variation in public expenditure, jobs, and output 
Several recent papers have employed spatial variation in US public spending to identify job 
and output effects. The estimated job impacts vary with the identification strategy used. 
Suárez Serrato and Wingender (2016) used exogenous shocks to spending resulting from 
changes in county population and reported that every $30,000 in spending creates one 
additional job. Allocation rules in fiscal spending – e.g. those related to the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) – have also been used as a source of exogenous 
                                                          
1 Focusing on federal contracting in cities has, nevertheless, advantages relative to research at a larger 
geographical scale, as the urban dimension permits methodologies for the identification of causal impacts of 
contract expenditure that are unavailable at larger territorial level.  
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variation in spending across states. Instrumenting state-level spending with ARRA allocation 
rules, Wilson (2012) estimated that a job is created for every $125,000 spent. Feyrer and 
Sacerdote (2011) considered the impact of actual ARRA spending (including grants and 
loans) on employment-to-population ratios at the state and county level over 20 months of the 
program. Exploiting the years served by the local congressional delegation as an exogenous 
predictor of the amount of ARRA spending channeled to a specific location, they calculated 
that the creation of an additional job requires between $43,000 and $100,000 of public 
spending at the state level, and between $500,000 and $3.3 million at the county level. 
Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) similarly examined exogenous spending due to allocation rules 
and put the job cost at $26,000. Shoag (2013) investigated state variation in public 
expenditure arising from (exogenous) financial shocks to state pension funds,  calculating the 
cost per job at $23,000. These job impact estimates have generally focused on employment 
changes within a particular state, ignoring the spatial impact of expenditure. 
Subnational analyses have considered the output increase attributable to one dollar of public 
expenditure – the multiplier – to range between $1.1 and $2, although there are significant 
deviations. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) explained state-level GDP per capita on the basis 
state-level military spending, using quarterly data between 1966 and 2006 and instrument 
military spending using a shift-share approach. They reported a multiplier of military 
spending on output of 1.4 for states (reaching 1.8 for census regions), which rises to 2.4 with 
the shift-share instrument. Similarly, Shoag (2013) found that the multiplier on state spending 
identified from pension fund return shocks is also 1.4. Higher multipliers (between 1.7 and 2) 
have been revealed by Suárez Serrato and Wingender (2016). Conversely, Fishback and 
Kachanovskaya’s (2010) analysis of the New Deal grants at the state-level during the 1930s 
and 1940s yielded a significantly lower multiplier (1.1). Their estimates of the effects of 
government purchases (excluding direct transfers) rise to $1.8, although the confidence 
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intervals are wide. When accounting for the taxation financing expenditure, the multiplier 
may be lower – Clemens and Miran (2012), for example, show that balanced-budget 
multipliers can fall well below 1 – around 0.4.  
Different multipliers on output and costs per employment have also been reported by the 
literature on local incentives, subsidies and zones. Firm subsidies and tax incentives are 
deemed to lead to increases in wages and employment, although the estimated impacts vary 
by methodology, program and location (cf. Greenstone et al., 2010; Ham et al., 2011, 
Neumark and Simpson, 2015). These multipliers are, however, less intimately related to our 
analysis, as such research concentrates on types of public spending that pursue different aims.  
 
2.2. Going beyond past research 
The paper takes the literature on spatial variation in public expenditure, jobs, and output as a 
starting point, but goes beyond existing knowledge on two counts. First, we focus on a 
significant source of public spending which has been neglected at the urban level. Much of 
the relevant urban-oriented work that precedes our research focuses on grants, subsidies, and 
general investment and development programs that purposely target job creation and 
production in specific geographical areas. The influence of public contracting on economic 
development has been largely ignored. The distinction between government subsidies or 
grants, on the one hand, and federal contracting, on the other is, however, important. 
Government contracting leads to the acquisition or production of public goods and services 
and investment. Local development is thus a side-effect or a byproduct. Subsidies and 
economic zone interventions are explicitly designed to promote development in specific 
areas. Because of this difference, the local effects of public contracts per dollar spent are 
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conceivably smaller than those associated with public subsidies.2 However, funds earmarked 
for public contracting tend to exceed those deployed as grants and subsidies, meaning that, 
despite a potentially smaller per-dollar impact, their aggregate effect could be far larger.  
Second, the granularity of our data facilitates a more precise analysis than what has been 
undertaken in the past. We are thus able to offer new evidence on the output multiplier and 
job impact of public expenditure. The exact contributions derived from the analysis at this 
finer spatial scale are three-fold. First, impact estimates are often plagued by concerns of 
causality: while public spending can generate greater output, the reverse is also true: 
increases in output may result in higher levels of public spending.3 The vast majority of 
research in the field applies a shift-share instrument under the assumption that the allocation 
of spending over states can be considered exogenous, even if aggregate national spending 
may be endogenous. However, it is highly possible that some federal expenditure decisions 
are taken with particular US states in mind. Additionally, states are well represented at the 
federal level, potentially leading to targeting due to pork-barrel politics (Larcinese et al., 
2006). By exposing city-level variation, we are able to i) relax the assumption that individual 
states (in a group of 50 states) do not affect national expenditure in exchange for the less 
stringent assumption than individual cities (in a group of over 300) do not determine 
aggregate national expenditure in broad (NAICS-1) categories; and ii) estimate this 
conditional on fixed effects accounting for state-specific shocks. This involves including 
state-level representation, by comparing the outcomes of national expenditure decisions 
across cities in the same state. As a second contribution, we are able to identify the localized 
                                                          
2  Public contracting is not mainly directed towards areas where the potential resources are under-utilized and 
therefore can crowd out private demand. Government contracts in some cases may also play a distinctive 
development role: competitions for contracts can take into account the city of the bidding firm. As that adds a 
different (political) motivation to the contract award, the impact may differ. Unfortunately, our dataset does not 
record that motivation. We design the empirical strategy to avoid that political targeting conflates with our 
causal interpretation of the impact of expenditure. 
3 Although, especially in cross-sectional variation, it may be argued that the federal government could also be 
channelling more expenditure per head to lagging areas.  
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impacts of federal contract spending, implying that the measured effect is isolated from the 
taxation that finances expenditure. Citizens of a city receiving a federal contract can generally 
not anticipate substantial changes in federal tax rates. This sets our study apart from others 
that report the policy impact net of taxes (e.g., Clemens and Miran, 2012), as we segregate 
pure expenditure effects irrespective of tax distortions. This does, however, introduce the 
disadvantage that our results need to be benchmarked against a set of separately estimated 
costs of public funds to assess the efficiency of federal contract expenditure. Third, the 
geographical detail enables us to measure spatial effects. Past research has been unable to 
distinguish between the place where the contract is allocated (recipient location) and the 
place where the expenditure is effectively conducted (location of the activity). This difference 
may be especially relevant, particularly in lagging areas where the mismatch between the 
recipient location and the location of the activity is likely to be greatest. Moreover, we can 
measure the impact of federal contracting in areas close to where the expenditure took place. 
This is relevant for understanding the overall impact of expenditure at the urban level, but 
also for identification. As Ramey (2011) suggests, in cross-sectional estimates with time-
fixed effects, spatial movements and transfers may easily be mistaken for positive impacts on 
economic growth and employment. The analysis we conduct also captures the extent of 
spatial impacts and relocation. 
 
3. Data 
3.1. The urban geography of federal contracting 
In order to analyze the impact of public expenditure on the economic development of cities in 
the US, we have assembled a dataset containing information about every single federal 
contract above $3,000 for the period between 2005 and 2014. The details on all federal 
contracts over $3,000 are published under the Federal Funding Accountability and 
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Transparency Act (FFATA) of 2006 by the Bureau of Fiscal Services (Dept. of Treasury). 
The contracts vary in amounts, locations and types of goods. For instance, in January 2014, 
the smallest contract in the state of Oregon was for a delivery of apples to the Defense 
Logistics Agency of the Department of Defense by the Portland-based Pacific Coast fruit 
company. The largest contracts in Oregon during that period related to the temporary 
procurement of firefighting helicopters from Oregon and California. Other contracts were 
awarded for window and sewer repairs, the procurement of IT and mechanical equipment, 
and the provision of occupational training courses and consultancy services. 
Federal contracting accounts for a fair share of overall federal spending. Close to $4.82 
trillion – or, on an annualized basis, around $400 billion – were spent over the period of 
analysis. In 2014 alone $446 billion were allocated to federal contracts above the $3,000 
threshold. This is equal to $1,375 spent per American and ranks only behind grants ($603 
billion) and other financial assistance ($1.7 trillion) – which includes Medicare, 
unemployment benefits, and the like – as the third most important category of federal 
spending. The data do not include federal salaries.  
In order to match contract data to the other variables used in the analysis, the contract 
information is aggregated at the US metropolitan and micropolitan statistical area level by 
NAICS 1-digit industry.4 We combine contracts by the location codes or by the contract 5-
digit zip codes that belong to each core-based statistical area (CBSA). Individual contracts 
normally include information about the location of performance – the place where the 
contracted work is performed – as well as the address of the contract recipient. These 
locations often coincide. In some cases, however, public services and products are produced 
at a different location from that where the contracting firm is based. Not all contracts are 
                                                          
4 The data are freely available. Individual federal contracts were processed using a high-performance computing 
cluster, as the source files are large (around 70Gb). The codes and processed datasets are available from the 
authors’ websites. 
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georeferenced. 85% of the total value of federal contracts can be positioned geographically, if 
location of performance is considered. This percentage rises to 94% when the address of the 
contract recipient is used. Our spending data identify contract recipients in 920 core-based 
statistical areas. These cities concentrate 80% of all identified federal contracting in the US, 
with the rest going to rural areas and/or to Alaska and Hawaii. The GDP data for CBSAs, 
however, do not cover all urban areas in the contract dataset. Matching both datasets results 
in a coverage of a maximum of 373 cities.5 Employment and wage data are available at a 
finer geographical scale, meaning that a maximum of 655 cities are included in the wage and 
employment-based regressions. For 2014, the full contracting city sample covers around 285 
million people (or 89% of the US total population). When looking exclusively at GDP data at 
urban level, the coverage is reduced to 256 million people (around 80% of total population). 
There is a distinct urban bias in federal contracting that reflects the concentration of firms in 
cities. Contracts awarded to firms in urban areas represent an average expenditure per annum 
of $1,260 per capita at the location of performance and $1,500 at the location of the recipient 
(see also Table 1) – or 91.6 and 109.1% respectively of federal contracting per capita.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
The production and provision of goods and services by federally contracted entities is, 
however, uneven across US cities. Figure 1 maps the location of federal contract spending per 
capita in 2014, taking into account the location of performance. Federal contracting was 
heavily concentrated in a small number of cities and regions. Some large cities, such as 
Washington, Boston, Atlanta, St Louis, Denver, Salt Lake City, Cincinnati, San Jose, and 
Sacramento were among the few urban areas that attracted more than $2,000 of expenditure 
per capita in 2014 (Figure 1). Federal and state capitals drew relatively greater amounts per 
capita in federal contracts. This was true of Washington, D.C., Boston (Ma.), Concord 
                                                          
5 The unmatched areas have less population, are generally small, and have no reported GDP.   
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(N.H.), Hartford (Ct.), Providence (R.I.), Richmond (Va.), Atlanta (Ga.), Denver (Co.), Salt 
Lake City (Ut.), and Sacramento (Ca.). By contrast, the country’s three largest 
agglomerations – New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago – benefitted relatively little from 
federal contracts. Expenditure in the metropolitan areas of New York and Chicago, at $480 
and $590 per capita respectively in 2014, was well under the national average. Similarly, 
many medium-sized and often declining cities along the Mississippi valley, the Rust- or 
Snowbelts, the mid-West, or the California Central Valley were also among the least favored 
by federal contracting (Figure 1). Expenditure through contracting was, by contrast, high in 
cities with a strong military tradition, such as Norfolk, Va., San Diego, Ca., Tacoma, Wa., or 
Tucson, Az. (with a respective expenditure per capita of $1,800; $2,520; $2,050; and $3,200).  
The Department of Defense was the biggest single contributor to public contracts. In some of 
the years included in the analysis, it disbursed over half of all the funds linked to federal 
contracting. The object of defense contracts ranged from aircraft and vehicles to IT and 
consulting services. 
The distribution of contract expenditure across cities also differs by type of spending. Figure 
2  shows federal contract expenditure in infrastructure (Figure 2a) – which includes, among 
other things, water and sewerage services, power infrastructure, highways, streets, and other 
civil engineering – and manufacturing (Figure 2b). Federal contracting in infrastructure in 
2014 was under $250 per capita in more than 90% of continental US cities. There was, 
however, evidence of concentration of expenditure in some cities, New Orleans included, that 
were recovering from natural disasters (Figure 2a). Patterns of expenditure in manufacturing 
more closely matched those in overall federal contracting expenditure (Figure 2b).  
[Figure 2 about here] 
The correlation between federal contract expenditure and city size is confirmed by Figure 3, 
which plots expenditure in federal contracting per capita in 2014 against city size, proxied by 
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the log of the population. It implies that federal contract expenditure is positively related to 
city size; as a rule, the larger the city, the greater the federal spending in contracts per capita. 
The relationship holds for both place of performance and of recipient. The regression line that 
summarizes the relationship between federal contract expenditure at the recipient location 
and city size is, however, marginally steeper than that which captures the association between 
expenditure at the place of performance and population. This suggests that the spatial 
concentration of firms that succeed in winning tenders exceeds that of where the work takes 
place. Hence, a portion of contracted activities in smaller cities are likely executed by 
contract recipients from larger cities. All of that said, however, because many of the main 
beneficiaries of contracts are medium-sized cities, the relationship between city size and 
federal contracting is imperfect, especially in the case of place of performance (Figure 3).  
[Figure 3 about here] 
3.2. Matching data 
In the analysis, federal contract data are combined with other urban data for the micropolitan 
and metropolitan areas of the 48 continental states of the US. The other data include city 
population (US Census Bureau); output and GDP (US Bureau of Economic Analysis); and 
wages and employment (American Community Surveys). Table 1 reports both the 
unweighted and weighted (by population in 2014) city averages for all of the above. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4. Methodology 
In order to make the analysis comparable with previous research – especially with that on 
fiscal multipliers – we explain GDP and employment using the variation in federal contract 
expenditure across US cities. A mere statistical association between output and federal 
contract expenditure does not necessarily uncover the economic impact of federal 
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contracting. The allocation of contracts across cities is, in all likelihood, not random. The 
economic circumstances of a city determine the geographical allocation of expenditure. 
Political motivations cannot be discarded as factors influencing the distribution of federal 
contracting. Equally, unobserved variables may also play a role: if a large firm goes bankrupt, 
its demise decreases production in the city where it was located, reducing, at the same time, 
the chances of a city being awarded a contract. To deal with this issue, we pursue two 
different strategies: a) the shift-share instrumentation of local contract expenditure and b) 
controlling for the initial situation and unobserved shocks in each city by means of city and 
state-year fixed effects. We employ a standard multiplier equation (Nakamura and Steinsson, 
2014) at the city-year level to estimate the impact of spending on a number of economic 
outcomes. The equation adopts the following form: 
(
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑐𝑎𝑝
)
𝑐,𝑡
= 𝛽 (
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑐𝑎𝑝
)
𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡, 
where subscripts c, s, and t denote metro- or micropolitan area, state, and year, respectively. 
We estimate this equation by means of the weighted (instrumental) least squares version of 
this regression – using the population measures as weights – to be able to recover nationally 
applicable estimates.  
In order to provide a causal interpretation, we use a shift-share (or Bartik) instrumental 
variable approach. This approach captures the exogeneity of the aggregate spending in 
individual cities by projecting national contracting growth rates in different industries on the 
initial allocation of contracts across cities in those industries. We uncover the variation across 
cities, assuming that national spending decisions are not driven by shocks to specific cities. 
The identification of the IV regressions relies on the idea that the effects of national 
contracting decisions vary across cities in an exogenous way – the instrument is focused on 
the interaction between cities’ initial shares of contract expenditure in different industries and 
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the national growth rates of expenditure in those industries. Thus, the shift-share instrument 
exploits the local impact of national expenditure decisions in order to rule out that city-
specific shocks that may affect both federal contract expenditure and GDP or employment 
(like the loss of individual firms) explain our result. Using a related strategy, Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2014) posit that differences in the allocation of military spending between states is 
exogenous, even if the aggregate spending is endogenous.  
We include two different sets of fixed effects. First, the city-level fixed effects, 𝛼𝑐, control 
for time-invariant selection processes, such as the location of the city or other forms of spatial 
heterogeneity. By absorbing long-run contracting patterns for each city, the instrument is not 
sensitive to time-invariant city specialization patterns, such as the presence of a large 
automobile industry or a high-tech tradition. The second set of fixed effects, 𝛼𝑠,𝑡, controls for 
shocks at the state-year level. This set of fixed effects absorbs unobserved shocks among co-
located cities. State-year fixed effects also control for differences in business cycles 
(Domazlicky, 1980; Hess and Shin, 1998; Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina 2016). They as well 
account for political selection, particularly for pork-barrel practices, whereby elected 
representatives in Washington secure federal contracts for their home state (Larcinese et al., 
2006; Cohen, Coval and Malloy, 2011), because the fixed effects absorb any state-level 
advantages in representation. With 300-500 cities in the sample (depending on which 
variables are included in the regression), the employment of state-year fixed effects facilitates 
a more effective ruling out of endogeneity related to political representation from any specific 
city than that which is possible via the use of  national (time) fixed effects.  
 
4.1. Instrumentation 
The shift-share instrument is constructed as follows. We first predict spending in a particular 
industry in a city, by projecting the national contracting changes in that industry on a city’s 
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initial allocation of spending. 1-digit NAICS-coded industries are used as categories. G 
denotes the amount of spending; i the metro- or micropolitan area; US the national aggregate; 
c the industry; and t the year. The projected spending is ?̂?𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝐺𝑖,𝑐,2005 ∗ 𝐺𝑈𝑆,𝑐,𝑡/𝐺𝑈𝑆,𝑐,2005. 
This term is the product of the amount of contract dollars a metro-(micro-)politan area was 
awarded for industry i in 2005; and the national growth rate of contracting in that industry.  
Aggregating the projected spending by industry for each metropolitan area yields a prediction 
of the aggregate spending by metropolitan area: ?̂?𝑐,𝑡 = ∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑐,𝑡𝑖 . This projected spending 
reflects city-level spending as if in the city, given the initial pattern of contracts received, the 
growth in contract expenditure followed the national average. The projection still contains 
national changes, which are plausibly not exogenous. However, given the identification of 
subnational variation, national shocks to federal spending can be controlled for using (state-) 
annual fixed effects. Equally, the long-run industrial pattern of a city may be endogenous, but 
variation is eliminated using location fixed effects. The instrument thus effectively exploits 
the differential sensitivity of cities to contracting in each industry.  
For the shift-share instrument to be relevant, some of the local changes in federal contracting 
need to be driven by national trends. Similarly, city-level variation in the initial conditions for 
the predicted total contracting expenditure changes is required. When decomposing the 
expenditure shares,6 roughly 12% of the variation in city-sector-year-specific contracting 
expenditure shares is accounted for by sector-year fluctuations; 41% by location-specific 
factors (invariant to time and sector); and 48% by idiosyncratic elements. The instrument 
passes the relevance tests: it predicts city-level expenditure well, conditional on city and 
state-year fixed effects. One potential risk is that national trends perfectly predict the 
                                                          
6 This is done as follows. 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡  is the share of contracting of sector i in the total contracting expenditure in city c 
at year t; 𝑠𝑖𝑐  is the over-time average contract expenditure share of sector i in city c; 𝑠𝑖𝑡  is the across-city 
(national) average contract expenditure share of industry i; and ?̃?𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖𝑐 − 𝑠𝑖𝑡  is the residual share. The 
variance decomposition is carried out by calculating 
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡,𝑠𝑖𝑐)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡)
, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡,𝑠𝑖𝑡)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡)
 and 
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡,?̃?𝑖𝑐𝑡)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡)
 respectively. 
The decomposition adds up to one (rounded percentages are reported). 
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developments of individual cities, if individual firms are very large or some industries are 
highly spatially concentrated. This, however, seems highly unlikely, as a fairly broad 1-digit 
classification is used. In 2014, the firm that secured the largest contract represented 2.4% of 
the contract value in its sector and the contract value share of the largest contract averaged 
3.2% across industries. As a general rule, the share of funding of the largest contract in an 
industry was larger in smaller industries. The share was 0.6% in the largest industry and 6% 
in the smallest one.  To the extent that specialized location patterns persist over time, the city 
fixed effects should absorb any small share of variation.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Effects on output 
Table 2 displays the results of the baseline regression, distinguishing between the recipient 
location (Table 2a) and the location where the activity took place (Table 2b). We report the 
results using federal contract spending measures lagged by one year.7 Column 1 shows the 
results of the OLS regression. They indicate that GDP per capita in a given US city was $1.7 
higher for every additional dollar awarded to a firm located in that city (recipient location) 
and $1.8 higher for every additional dollar spent (location of the activity). In order to rule out 
reverse causality, columns 2 to 5 summarize the instrumental variable regressions using the 
shift-share instrument as well as variations of the fixed effects structure. Across the whole 
range of results, instrumenting increases the estimated coefficient substantially. As the 
instrumentation eliminates the role of contract targeting by the federal government, the higher 
coefficients are consistent with a priority to award contracts to firms in poorer cities. The 
coefficients remain positive and significant, with exception of Column 4 in Table 2a. A 
                                                          
7 In Appendix Table A1, we provide a set of regressions with different lag structures, which suggests that the 
lagged contract spending yields the best fit in terms of t-statistic on the coefficient, overall F-statistics, and 
residual sum of squares.  
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heteroskedasticity-robust Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity suggests that in the preferred 
specifications, our spending measures cannot be considered exogenous (though that can be 
the case in some specifications with a less stringent fixed effects structure). The fixed effects 
also have a significant impact on the point estimate. State-year fixed effects increase the 
coefficient estimate, which could be explained by the implementation of anti-cyclical federal 
expenditure policies. City (MSA)-level fixed effects, by contrast, reduce the coefficient. The 
substantial impact on the coefficient is consistent with the substantial share of time-invariant 
variation between cities discussed in section 4.1. 
We run several diagnostic tests to ascertain the quality of the shift-share instrument. The 
Kleibergen-Paap (KP) Lagrange multiplier test – conditional on the fixed effects structure -- 
rejects underidentification for all models. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic suggests less than 
10% IV coefficient bias in the recipient location model (Table 2a), judging by the Stock and 
Yogo values. The bias may, however, be over 25% for the preferred model for the location of 
the activity (Table 2b, column 6). Conditional on the fixed effects, the instrument based on 
the location of performance is weaker than the instrument based on the location of the 
recipient. In addition, we conduct two indirect tests for instrument exogeneity following 
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017). First, we test if pre-trends are parallel, to rule out that 
unobserved variables predict both a city’s GDP developments and its (future) reception of 
contracts. We allow for serial correlation in the instrument and find that future values of the 
instrument do not predict second-stage residuals in our preferred specification (Table A1, 
Column 7), showing no sign of diverging pre-trends. Second, we isolate the principal 
components of inner-product variation in our instrument (the interaction of initial city-level 
contract expenditure shares in different industries and the national expenditure growth rates 
of those industries, conditional on location and time fixed effects) to test for 
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overidentification. The results, reported and discussed in Appendix B, show no signs of 
overidentification.  
The location of the awardee of the contract and the location of the activity itself are only 
introduced together in Table 2, Column 6. The straightforward approach to evaluate the two 
models (one based on the location of the recipient and the other on the place where the work 
was carried out) would be to estimate both measures jointly in all regressions. However, the 
close correlation between the two shift-share instruments (based on the same national growth 
rates) causes a weak instrument problem. To overcome this issue, we apply an artificial nest 
of the two instrumental variable regressions (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981).8 The p-value 
for the recipient location based prediction of GDP per capita is lower than 0.01 in the 
performance location-based regressions. That for the performance location is 0.609 in the 
recipient-based model. This implies that the recipient location-based measure encompasses 
the explanatory power of the other model, as corroborated by the OLS nest reported in 
Column 6, Table 2, where the coefficient for the recipient location is positive and significant, 
while that of the location of the activity is insignificant. Consequently, in the preferred 
estimate (Table 2a, Column 5), which includes city and state-year fixed effects, one dollar in 
contracting expenditure generates a revenue of $1.35 of GDP the year after the spending took 
place. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                          
8 First, the model is estimated with one of the location measures using the preferred specification (IV with fixed 
effects) to generate the predicted values (e.g., (
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑐𝑎𝑝
)
𝑐,𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡̂
= ?̂? (
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑐𝑎𝑝
)
𝑐,𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ ?̂?𝑐 + ?̂?𝑠,𝑡). Second, we 
introduce the predicted values of one model into the preferred specification of the other. In the first case, we 
estimate  (
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑐𝑎𝑝
)
𝑐,𝑡
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽 (
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑐𝑎𝑝
)
𝑐,𝑡
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛾 (
𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝑐𝑎𝑝
)
𝑐,𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡̂
+𝛼𝑐 + 𝛼𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡 by IV (and vice versa for 
the other model). Encompassing is tested as 𝛾 = 0, with the null that the model introduced through the predicted 
values has no additional explanatory power over the model in which it was inserted. 
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5.2. Effects on private GDP per capita, population, wages, and other government 
expenditure  
To understand better the overall economic effect of federal contracts, we consider several 
other outcomes. Table 3 presents the results, using shift-share instrumentation and fixed 
effects. Column 1 of Table 3 reports the impact of federal contracts on private GDP, 
excluding government production. The coefficient of 1.16 points to a smaller impact than on 
general GDP (14% lower than the 1.35 coefficient in Table 2a, Column 5). However, as 
private GDP represents 86% of overall GDP, there is no evidence that federal contracts 
stimulate private production to a greater extent than public production, or vice versa. When 
using the location-of-performance measure, the impact is high, but this measure has no 
explanatory power when controlling for the spending measure based on the location of the 
recipient. 
Column 2 of Table 3a reports a positive and significant impact of contract spending on 
population. The estimate implies that an expenditure of $175,000 in federal contracts attracts 
one additional migrant to the city where the money is allocated (Table 3b).  
The effect of contracting on wages is statistically insignificant, regardless of whether wages 
(Table 3a, Column 3), the log wages (Column 4), or the log wages purged for standard 
controls9 (Column 5) are considered. This result is reproduced when considering the location 
of performance (Table 3b, Columns 3-5).10 
[Table 3 about here] 
                                                          
9 We ran a regression using census microdata explaining individuals’ log wages from fixed effects for 
educational attainment; race fixed effects; gender; and age and age squared. The purged wage effect is the 
unexplained wage by metropolitan area by year; expressed in relative terms (as the equation is estimated in 
logs). The unexplained variation at the city-year level is at most a factor 2 (100%). The standard deviation is 
around 12%. 
 
10 The population and wage data from the Community Surveys cover more cities than the GDP data from the 
Census. Re-estimating the wage and population model on the original, smaller Census sample gives similar 
results – see Appendix C.  
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The estimated impact of federal contract public expenditure may be biased if other 
governments in the same area adjust their spending in response. If local governments cut 
spending, for instance, an unobserved variable bias arises, leading to underestimate the output 
impacts of contracts. We examine the response of local governments in Appendix D. Local 
governments barely increase their spending if their city receives a contract, suggesting little 
role for bias. 
 
5.3. Effects on employment  
Job generation is cited as another reason for local decision-makers to pursue federal contracts 
for their city. In Table 4, we apply the same framework as in Table 2 to explore the impact of 
federal contracting on urban employment in the US.11 Once again, we artificially nest the 
relevance of the location of the recipient of the contract and that where the activity actually 
takes place. As in the case of the analysis of the impact on GDP per head, the estimations 
include fixed effects at the city and state-year level and the instrumentation of the spending 
per capita variable. The results highlight that federal contracting is linked to employment 
generation both at the location of the recipient firm as well as in the cities where the activity 
occurs. However, and in contrast to the impact on GDP per head, the effects on employment 
are greater at the location of the activity than that of the recipient. The nesting test also 
suggests that the recipient-location model has no explanatory power in addition to the 
location of activity model. The employment effects are statistically significant in all 
estimations. Employment generation operates through both getting the unemployed to work 
(extensive margin) and making those employed work more hours (intensive margin). Most of 
the impact on jobs happens, however, through the intensive margin, that is, through 
                                                          
11 The dataset used in the employment analysis is larger than that used in the GDP analysis, as data for jobs are 
available for more metropolitan areas. In any case, the results hardly vary if the employment regressions are 
conducted for the exact same sample used in the GDP analysis. The regressions for this smaller sample are 
reported in Appendix C. 
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additional work for those already in employment rather than through the creation of new jobs 
– 60% of all additional work goes to already employed workers, while the share of hours 
accounted for by previously unemployed individuals is limited to 40%.  
The row ‘cost per jobs’ calculates the overall cost of an additional FTE job (40 hours of work 
per week, times 45 weeks). The results stress that more than $247,000 in federal contracting 
are needed to create a new full-time job at the location of the activity along the extensive 
margin – moving unemployed workers into employment. That is not far off the migration 
response of one citizen per roughly $175,000. The extensive margin job cost rises to more 
than $518,000 at the location of the recipient firm (Table 4, Column 1). By contrast, 
incorporating both the external and internal margins (i.e. measuring as well the increase in 
hours for those already in employment), an additional FTE job is created for every $68,000 
spent at the location of the activity, or every $164,000 spent at the location of the recipient 
(Table 4, Column 4). These results confirm that federal contracting has been better at 
increasing the number of hours worked by those in employment than at generating new jobs 
for those unemployed or entering the market for the first time.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
5.4. Spatial and time effects 
How big is the spatial reach of the economic impact of federal contracting? A contract in one 
place may induce additional demand in other locations. Failing to consider this would bias 
the results for two reasons. First, any estimation would understate the effects of contract 
expenditure, because increases in GDP outside the city where the firm receiving the contract 
is located or where the activity related to the contract occurs are not considered. Second, as 
state-year fixed effects are included in the analysis, any spatial effects may be compared to an 
incorrect benchmark. Let us suppose, for instance, that contracting in one city draws 
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resources away from other cities in the same state. As the impact on cities is compared to the 
state-average, this suggests that the contracting effect is measured twice: first, in the higher 
GDP in the city benefitting from the contract and, second, in other cities experiencing a 
downturn as a result. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The potential spatial effects of federal contract expenditure can be identified by considering 
the GDP impacts of federal expenditure in nearby locations. We assume the impacts decay 
with distance, although we have no theoretical prior about the exact extent of the spillover 
effect. We consider three dimensions of geographical distance. First, we draw concentric 
rings around each city included in the analysis, with a 200 km radius. We aggregate 
expenditure in federal contracts within these rings (the measures are mutually exclusive, 
meaning that the outer rings can be considered as “doughnuts”). This is our preferred 
measure, as, given US geography and the distance between the cities included in the analysis, 
all cities considered have at least one neighboring city in the first concentric ring . Secondly, 
we follow the same procedure for three smaller rings: using 50 km incremental radiuses in 
each additional ring. Third, we estimate the local economic impacts of federal contracting 
taking place in a) the five nearest cities; b) the next five nearest cities; and c) the cities ranked 
between ten and fifteen in terms of distance. This approach takes into account that relative, 
rather than absolute, distance may determine the impacts of federal contracts. 
Columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 5 report the IV regressions that explain GDP per capita in a city 
by contract expenditure in surrounding cities. Column 1 shows the model with contract 
expenditure in concentric rings of 200 km radius each. The coefficient for local expenditure 
is slightly higher than in the baseline case, but federal contracting at a distance of between 
400 and 600 km from the city is associated with slightly lower local GDP per capita. In order 
to compare the aggregate multiplier, we simulate an added dollar of expenditure per capita 
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for every city, and calculate the aggregate GDP increase (including spatial effects). For the 
preferred spatial model in column 1, the aggregate multiplier is only marginally higher than 
the baseline estimate of 1.35. A joint F-test of the ring variables suggests that they are 
significant, although the introduction of expenditure in rings surrounding the city does not 
affect the overall results. 12   
Columns 2 and 3 reproduce the exercise for rings with 50 km radiuses and groups of nearest 
cities respectively. They also show significance of the spatial variables from a joint F-test. 
The aggregate multipliers are comparable to column 1 (if somewhat higher when using the 
50km rings). The Table also reports an overall model F-statistics as a goodness-of-fit measure 
conditional on the fixed effects included in the model. The F-statistics are comparable across 
specifications.  
For reference, column 4 of Table 5 repeats the baseline model using OLS and no fixed 
effects. Again, the coefficient estimates are higher in this case and the ring variables are 
significantly associated with local GDP, suggesting the presence of spillovers. Avoiding 
dealing with causality leads, however, to different outcomes. In particular, the coefficient for 
expenditure in surrounding rings become positive, while in the model addressing 
endogeneity, they are zero or negative. A potential explanation for this difference is the 
targeting of contracts to areas with higher GDP, which surfaces in column 4, but not column 
1. Columns 5 and 6 test alternative specifications. Column 5 reports a model with per capita 
expenditure in the nearest cities.13 Column 6 reports expenditure measures in the rings based 
                                                          
12 The shift-share instruments seem relevant for the ring they were created for. Tables F1 and G1 in Appendix, 
show that i) the correlations between instruments for rings of different ranges are not high and ii) that 
instruments for individual rings predict contract expenditure in their respective ring, conditional on the other 
instruments. 
 
13 This model is estimated exclusively for the nearest-city sample, because, by construction, all cities in this 
sample have observations for per capita federal contract spending in neighboring areas. This is not the case, for 
example, when considering observed federal contracting in concentric 50 km radius rings. A considerable 
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on the location of activity rather than on the location of the recipient. Both point to somewhat 
higher impacts from federal contracting expenditure at close range or inside the city. The 
impact is, in contrast, negative the greater the distance. The aggregate multiplier is 
comparable to previous results.  
 The presence of spatial autocorrelation (conditional on fixed effects) can bias the estimates. 
Regressing federal contract expenditure per capita in a metropolitan area on contract 
expenditure per capita taking place within a 200 km radius only hints at small impacts from 
the contracting in surrounding areas (coefficient 0.03). A Moran’s I plot based on inverse 
distance shows that for a given city, the inverse-distance weighted average expenditure of 
other cities cannot explain contract expenditure (the statistic is 0.005) (Figure E1 in 
Appendix).  
To examine whether spatial dependence affects the baseline estimates, we introduce spatial 
lags of GDP per capita, using normalized inverse distance as weights. The model is estimated 
by spatial two stage least squares, which can accommodate an additional endogenous variable 
as well as the fixed effects. The spatial lag model in column 7 of Table 5 can be compared to 
the OLS model in Column 1 of Table 2 (coefficient: 1.73), which was run without fixed 
effects or shift-share instrumentation. The significant coefficient on the spatial lag insinuates 
the existence of potential indirect effects of expenditure. However, when introducing the 
shift-share instrument and the fixed effects structure in Column 8, the spatial lag is 
statistically insignificant and the estimated effect of contract expenditure hardly changes after 
allowing for a spatial autoregressive term.14 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
number of US metropolitan areas are not located within a 50 km distance from another city. This would lead to 
considerable difficulties in interpreting the coefficients. 
 
14 This is not entirely surprising. The spatial lag model in matrix form is 
𝑮𝑫𝑷
𝒄𝒂𝒑
= 𝜌𝑾
𝑮𝑫𝑷
𝒄𝒂𝒑
+ 𝛽
𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈
𝒄𝒂𝒑
+ 𝜶𝒄 + 𝜶𝒔𝒕 + 𝜺, where 
the bold face indicates column vector for variables; 𝑾 denotes the weights matrix and 𝜌 is the spatial autoregressive 
coefficient. In reduced form, this is 
𝑮𝑫𝑷
𝒄𝒂𝒑
= [𝐼 − 𝜌𝑾]−1 [𝛽
𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈
𝒄𝒂𝒑
+ 𝜶𝒄 + 𝜶𝒔𝒕 + 𝜺], which effectively adds distance-
weighted observations of spending per capita to the non-spatial specification, instead of aggregate expenditure. The 
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What about the time dimension? Table A1 in Appendix reports the baseline regression using 
different time lags. The individual lags in isolation (Table A1, Columns 1-3) display positive 
coefficients that fade over time. Judging by the overall F-statistic, the individual fit is best for 
the 1-year lag, that is, one year after the expenditure linked to the contract happens (Table 
A1, Column 2). Introducing simultaneously the no-lag and the 1-year lagged measure in 
column 4 leads to a relatively high coefficient for the 1-year lag variable. The coefficient for 
the no-lag variable is, by contrast, reduced in comparison to those when the different time 
lags are regressed in isolation from one another. Although it could be argued that the 
instrument between the two expenditure measures may be correlated, the joint Cragg-Donald 
F-statistic of 9.80 suggests no problem of weak instruments (the 10% max IV size critical F-
statistic is 7.03). Adding more lags (Table A1, Column 5-6) renders all coefficients 
insignificant. Similar regressions examining 3-year lags (unreported) show the same pattern. 
All this implies that the impact of federal contracting on urban economic performance in the 
US is short-lived: it barely lasts more than two years after the expenditure takes place and is 
best observed after one year. 
 
6. Discussion 
The analysis is broadly consistent with earlier findings on the magnitude of multipliers, but 
suggests that the wage and employment effects of federal contracts are much lower than 
reported by previous literature.  
Our multiplier estimates of 1.4 to 1.6 are within the bounds set by earlier studies that, 
utilizing cross-state variation, arrive at multipliers of between 1.1 and 1.7 (Fishback and 
Kachanovskaya 2010; Nakamura and Steinsson; 2014; Suárez Serrato and Wingender 2016). 
They are also relatively close to the multiplier of 1.6 assumed for certain public policies, like 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
specification is thus reminiscent of the results in Table 5, Column 4 (spending per capita in concentric rings), which showed 
no significant spatial effects.  
27 
 
the 2009 fiscal stimulus package (Romer and Bernstein, 2009). We also find evidence to 
suggest that output effects often occur at the location of the recipient firm and not where the 
expenditure was projected, casting doubt on whether federal contracts can be accurately 
targeted. The results, moreover, imply that the impact is spatially limited and short-lived.  
The results show that federal contracts are far less effective at creating jobs in cities than 
other forms of spending (e.g. Greenstone et al., 2010; Ham et al., 2011; Hanson and Rohlin, 
2013; Busso, Gregory and Kline, 2013). With one full-time job created for every $68,000 
(and one person moving from unemployment to employment for every $250,000), the job 
cost estimates tower not only over those of dedicated job-creation programs (e.g. Criscuolo et 
al., 2012), but also over estimates for overall government spending (e.g., Shoag, 2013; 
Chodorow-Reich et al., 2012; Suárez Serrato and Wingender, 2016). Most employment 
effects occur at the intensive margin: e.g., the expansion of the hours worked by those already 
in employment. This is not be surprising, as it is likely that firms will grow to consider 
federal contracts as incidental demand shocks, for which they do not want or deem 
reasonable to expand their workforce.  
Our estimates also provide little in the way of evidence for a substantial wage impact. This is 
a notable point of divergence between our research and previous investigations into the 
returns of incentives, subsidies, and grants (e.g. Greenstone et al., 2010; Ham et al., 2011; 
Hanson and Rohlin, 2013; and Busso, Gregory, and Kline, 2013).  
The employment impacts are concentrated at the location of contract implementation, rather 
than at the location of the recipient firm. This mirrors the impacts on output, which occur at 
the location of the recipient firm. There are two potential explanations for this. First, as 
indicated by Feyrer and Sacerdote (2011), while employment – i.e. the work itself – usually 
takes place where the public contract is conducted, inputs – the materials needed for the 
construction of a road, for example – can be procured from anywhere and may, in particular, 
28 
 
be sourced from suppliers near the recipient firm. That can undermine the output effects at 
the location of performance. Second, the result may be due to accounting differences between 
the employment and GDP data. The recipient firm may hire workers at the location where the 
work is executed, but the value added ends up in the accounts of the firm, placing the output 
effect at the recipient firm’s location. As our employment estimates stem from US census 
microdata and hence do not rely on firm-level data, the employment impacts may be 
registered where the contracted work is performed. Unfortunately, the data do not allow 
testing these two contrasting explanations.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In the US, an average of $1,500 per individual is spent in federal contracts every year. The 
contracts fund the federal acquisition of goods and services, but they are also regarded by 
some as tools for economic development. Consequently, the competition among urban and 
local decision-makers for these contracts is intense. But do federal contracts really catalyze 
urban economic growth and employment? This question has attracted far less attention than it 
deserves given the huge sums of money that are channeled in the direction of federal 
contracts (more than $400 billion per year, which easily exceed the more commonly assessed 
territorial policies, such as grants, subsidies, and zoning). 
This paper has addressed this gap in our knowledge and analyzed the job and output impacts 
of federal contact expenditure for a panel of more than 300 cities. We address confounding 
explanations, such as the targeting of the funds, via a spatial fixed effect strategy with shift-
share instrumentation. The results suggest that federal contract expenditure has a modest 
impact on output. The multiplier ranges between $1.4 and $1.6 in GDP for every contract 
dollar spent. The impact is also short-lived and spatially limited. A new full-time equivalent 
job is created for every $68,000 in expenditure, but two thirds of this impact comes from 
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increasing the working hours for those already in employment, rather than from the creation 
of entirely new jobs. For every $250,000, one unemployed worker is employed. The output 
effects of contracts occur mainly at the location of the firm that receives the contract, while 
the employment effects tend to manifest themselves at the location of contract execution, 
which may be a different location. 
Overall, the results of the paper raise reasonable questions about the potential of federal 
contracts as tools for the promotion of economic change. While our estimates point to modest 
output effects, the employment impacts are limited in absolute terms, and relative to other 
literature. This is consistent with the aim of federal contracts. Federal contracts, in contrast to 
incentive and development programs, are simply not granted with a view to impel 
development. They are not designed as instruments for the promotion of economic progress 
and dynamism. City governments may pursue federal contracts to cultivate local economic 
activity or deliver votes, but in light of our results, particularly on employment effects, a 
reliance on federal contracts seems an ill-advised economic development policy when 
contrasting their impacts to the costs.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES IN THE MAIN TEXT 
Figure 1. Contract spending per capita 2014 (location of performance) 
 
Source: Own elaboration with Bureau of Fiscal Services (Dept. of Treasury) data.  
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Figure 2. Infrastructure and manufacturing contract expenditure per capita (location of 
performance) 
Figure 2a     Figure 2b 
 
  
Source: Own elaboration with Bureau of Fiscal Services (Dept. of Treasury) data.  
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Figure 3. Contract expenditure and city size (2014). 
 
Source: Own elaboration with Bureau of Fiscal Services (Dept. of Treasury) data. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (2014). 
Variable Mean 
(unweighted) 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
(pop. weighted) 
Dollars contracted (recipient) $4.49 bln $1344 bln $6.08 bln 
Dollars contracted (performance) $5.34 bln $824 bln $4.41 bln 
Dollars contracted/cap (recipient) $703 $2,655 $1,502 
Dollars contracted/cap (performance) $1,011 $1,855 $1,261 
GDP per capita $41,922 $14,595 $52,177 
Employment rate 0.92 0.03 0.92 
Wage $24,750 $6,831 $30,724 
Hours worked per week (if employed) 39.15 1.11 39.17 
Weeks worked per year (if employed) 45.61 0.93 46.06 
Note: sources: expenditure measures stem from the Bureau of Fiscal Services (Dept. of Treasury), combined 
with population data from the US Census Bureau. GDP in real terms is extracted from the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Employment is the shared of employed in the labor force. Wage (nominal) and employment 
data are from author elaborations using data from the American Community Surveys. 
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Table 2. Effects of federal contracting on metropolitan GDP per capita by recipient location 
and location of the activity. 
2a. Recipient location 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap 
 OLS IV IV IV IV OLS 
Recipient location       
Contract spending/capt-1 1.733*** 2.189*** 3.146*** 0.707 1.352*** 1.639*** 
 (0.141) (0.201) (0.274) (0.444) (0.491) (0.380) 
Location of the activity       
Contract spending/capt-1      0.00577 
      (0.234) 
       
Kleibergen-Paap LM   13.27 48.18 13.72 27.29  
p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Wu-Hausman p-value  0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00  
Observations 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 
MSA FE    yes yes  
state-year FE   yes  yes  
 
 
2b. Location of the activity 
 GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap 
 OLS IV IV IV IV OLS 
Recipient location       
Contract spending/capt-1      1.639*** 
      (0.579) 
Location of the activity       
Contract spending/capt-1 1.812*** 1.776*** 1.553*** 2.870*** 6.001** 0.00577 
 (0.252) (0.280) (0.220) (0.663) (2.447) (0.356) 
       
Kleibergen-Paap LM   23.80 107.5 18.46 6.203  
p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01  
Wu-Hausman p-value  0.74 0.55 0.00 0.01  
Observations 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 
MSA FE    yes yes  
state-year FE   yes  yes  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap LM is the Lagrange multiplier test. Wu-Hausman p-
value is the p-value of the heteroscedasticity-robust test for exogeneity of the spending measure (the null is 
exogeneity).*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Effects of federal contracting on private GDP per capita, population, and wages. 
3a. Recipient location 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 private  
GDP/cap 
population wage log wage purged log wagea 
 IV IV IV IV IV 
Recipient location      
Contract spending/capt-1 1.157*** 23.18** 0.214 2.85e-06 -3.04e-06 
 (0.439) (10.82) (0.241) (7.96e-06) (4.98e-06) 
      
Kleibergen-Paap LM  27.29 27.99 24.90 24.90 24.90 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 3,015 5,194 5,237 5,237 5,237 
state-year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
metropolitan FE yes yes yes yes yes 
 
3b. Location of the activity 
 private  
GDP/cap 
population wage log wage purged log wagea 
 IV IV IV IV IV 
Location of the activity      
Contract spending/capt-1 5.041** -4.844 0.277 5.54e-06 1.66e-05 
 (2.117) (16.86) (0.690) (2.81e-05) (2.56e-05) 
      
Kleibergen-Paap LM  6.203 0.769 0.618 0.618 0.618 
p-value 0.01 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Observations 3,015 5,195 5,238 5,238 5,238 
state-year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
metropolitan FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Regressions weighted according to the location’s population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Kleibergen-
Paap LM is the Lagrange multiplier test. Wu-Hausman p-value is the p-value of the heteroscedasticity-robust 
test for exogeneity of the spending measure (the null is exogeneity).*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a The log wage residual after controlling for education; race; gender and age effects. 
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Table 4. Effects of federal contracting on jobs. 
4a. Recipient location 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 employment weeks 
(conditionala) 
weekly hours 
(conditionala) 
total hours 
(unconditionala) 
 IV IV IV IV 
Recipient location     
Contract spending/capt-1 ($1,000) 0.00311** 0.0343 0.133*** 10.97** 
 (0.00125) (0.0409) (0.0429) (4.456) 
     
Kleibergen-Paap LM  30.22 30.22 30.22 30.22 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value Wu Hausman 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.01 
Cost per job ($1,000 US) 518.3 2,226 508.0 164.1 
s.e. ($1,000 US) 208.0 2,656 163.1 66.64 
Observations 5,194 5,194 5,194 5,194 
state-year FE Yes Yes Yes yes 
metropolitan FE Yes Yes Yes yes 
     
4b. Location of the activity 
 employment weeks 
(conditionala) 
weekly hours (conditionala) total hours 
(unconditionala) 
 IV IV IV IV 
Location of the activity     
Contract spending/capt-1 ($1,000 US) 0.00652** 0.217** 0.189* 26.47** 
 (0.00298) (0.107) (0.109) (12.36) 
     
Kleibergen-Paap LM  6.701 6.701 6.701 6.701 
p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
p-value Wu Hausman 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Cost per job ($1,000 US) 247.2 352 359.5 68 
s.e. ($1,000 US) 112.9 174.1 207.4 31.76 
Observations 5,194 5,194 5,194 5,194 
state-year FE yes yes yes yes 
metropolitan FE yes yes yes yes 
Regressions weighted according to the location’s population. Kleibergen-Paap LM is the Lagrange multiplier test.  Wu-Hausman 
p-value is the p-value of the heteroscedasticity-robust test for exogeneity of the spending measure (the null is exogeneity). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a (Un)conditional on already in employment. 
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Table 5. Spatial effects of contracting. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap Are 
GDP/cap 
 IV IV IV OLS IV IV S2SLS S2SLS+IV 
         
         
Recipient location  
($ mln, t-1) 
        
Contract spending 1.487*** 1.629*** 1.640*** 1.736*** 1.879*** 1.953*** 1.683*** 1.372*** 
 (0.560) (0.593) (0.581) (0.140) (0.679) (0.675) (0.153) (0.536) 
Contract spending 0-200km 0.0400   0.0230     
 (0.0269)   (0.0282)     
Contract spending 200-400km 0.0179   0.0638***     
 (0.0326)   (0.0186)     
Contract spending 400-600km -0.0369**   0.0703**     
 (0.0186)   (0.0346)     
         
Contract spending 0-50km  0.125       
  (0.908)       
Contract spending 50-100km  -0.0832       
  (0.0661)       
Contract spending 100-150km  0.111**       
  (0.0434)       
Contract spending 1-5 nearest   0.0774**      
   (0.0360)      
Contract spending 6-10 nearest   -0.0628      
   (0.0538)      
Contract spending 11-15 nearest   -0.0606      
   (0.0409)      
         
Recipient location  
(per capita, t-1) 
        
Contract spending 0-200km     0.610*    
     (0.319)    
Contract spending 200-400km     -0.309    
     (0.248)    
Contract spending 400-600km     -0.654*    
     (0.361)    
     (0.0425)    
Location of activity  
($ mln, t-1) 
        
Contract spending 0-200km       0.178**   
      (0.0827)   
Contract spending 200-400km      0.0380   
      (0.0826)   
Contract spending 400-600km      -0.135**   
      (0.0542)   
         
W GDP/cap       0.244** -0.144 
       (0.098) (0.199) 
         
Observations 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 
state-year FE yes yes yes no yes yes  yes 
MSA FE yes yes yes no yes yes  yes 
F stat overall 2.481 2.649 1.757 49.59 1.776 3.148   
F-stat rings 0.0283 0.0147 0.0902 0.000634 0.0916 0.00185   
Aggr. multiplier 1.411 1.733 1.483 3.601 1.527 1.524   
Regressions weighted according to the location’s population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Table A1. Lagged contracting effects 
Effects on GDP per capita with different lags 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) 
 GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap GDP/cap̂  
 IV IV IV IV IV OLS 
Recipient location       
Contract spending/capt 1.052*   0.438 0.826  
 (0.623)   (0.755) (0.871)  
Contract spending/capt-1  1.418**  1.456 0.948  
  (0.633)  (0.988) (1.130)  
Contract spending/capt-2   1.004*  1.232  
   (0.565)  (1.045)  
Contract spending/capt-3       
       
Contract spending/capt+1      -0.048 
      (0.079) 
       
Observations 2,648 2,648 2,648 2,648 2,648  
state-year FE yes yes yes yes yes  
MSA FE yes yes yes yes yes  
F-stat 2.08 3.67 2.31 0.87 0.81  
Kleibergen-Paap LM 26.06 26.96 25.35 23.25 15.85  
MSS (10-9) 33.8 31.7 122.4 33.7 34.2  
Regressions weighted according to the location’s population. F-stat is the F-statistics of the regression 
conditional on partialling fixed effects. Kleibergen-Paap LM is the Lagrange multiplier test. RSS is the residual 
sum of squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Overidentification tests based on principal component analysis 
 
Effects on GDP per capita for different sets of principal components as instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GDPcap GDPcap GDPcap GDPcap GDPcap GDPcap 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV 
 PCA1 PCA1-2 PCA1-3 PCA1-4 PCA1-5 PCA1-6 
       
Contract spending/capt-1 1.325 1.411*** 1.403*** 1.373*** 1.293*** 1.247*** 
 (1.213) (0.487) (0.447) (0.434) (0.393) (0.392) 
       
Observations 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 
state-year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
MSA FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Cumulative factor prop 18% 28% 39% 49% 58% 68% 
       
Kleibergen-Paap LM 1.512 17.15 17.76 17.77 19.61 20.96 
p-value 0.219 0.000189 0.000492 0.00137 0.00148 0.00186 
Hansen- J  0.00451 0.00712 0.502 0.545 0.917 
p-value  0.946 0.996 0.919 0.969 0.969 
Standard errors clustered at MSA level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The estimates summarized by Table A5 reflect the procedure outlined by Goldsmith-Pinkham 
et al. (2017), by using the components of the inner product (the interaction between locational 
contract expenditure shares and national contract expenditure growth rates) to test for 
overidentification of a Bartik-type instrument. The procedure benefits from the fact that all 
individual shift-share predictors (each MSA’s initial contracting in a sector multiplied by the 
national contracting growth in that sector) are individual instruments. Employing all these 
instruments leads to a weak instrument problem, but when the number of instruments is 
reduced through principal component analysis, the components can be used to test for 
overidentification of the shift-share instrument. We, therefore, run a principal component 
analysis on the projected contracting per capita, using the MSA-year as observation and the 
sectoral expenditure as variables. This allows us to extract components that predict 
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fluctuations in groups of categories of federal contract expenditure per capita. The extracted 
components are then used as instruments, instead of the direct Bartik instrument, and in a J-
test of overidentification.  
The first column shows the baseline regression with the first principal component as an 
instrument. The first component explains most of the variation in the original shift-share 
instrument: its factor proportion is roughly 18%. Using only this variation, the null of 
underidentification (of the Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange multiplier test) cannot be rejected. 
Since there is a single instrument, overidentification cannot be tested. Adding the second 
principal component substantially increases the relevance of the instrument set, rejecting 
underidentification. The null of the Hansen J test (validity of the overidentifying restriction) 
cannot then be rejected. When subsequently extending the instrument set by iteratively 
including the next component with most explanatory power, this pattern persists.  
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Appendix C 
Table C1. Alternative indicators in the GDP sample 
Effects of contracts on other outcomes 
C1a. Recipient location 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 private 
GDP/cap 
population wage log wage purged log 
wagea 
 IV IV IV IV IV 
Recipient location      
Contract spending/capt-1 1.157*** 29.11* 0.259 4.91e-06 8.99e-07 
 (0.439) (15.23) (0.293) (9.71e-06) (5.94e-06) 
      
Observations 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 
state-year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
metropolitan FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Kleibergen-Paap LM 27.29 19.80 19.80 19.80 19.80 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
C1b. Location of the activity 
 private 
GDP/cap 
population wage log wage purged log 
wagea 
 IV IV IV IV IV 
Location of the activity      
Contract spending/capt-1 5.041** -7.972 0.781 2.23e-05 2.35e-05 
 (2.117) (22.86) (0.860) (2.64e-05) (3.10e-05) 
      
Observations 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 
state-year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
metropolitan FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Kleibergen-Paap LM 6.203 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 
p-value 0.0128 0.392 0.392 0.392 0.392 
Regressions weighted according to the location’s population. Kleibergen-Paap LM is the Lagrange multiplier 
test. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a The log wage residual after controlling for education; race; gender and age effects. 
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Table C2. Effects of federal contracting on jobs in the GDP sample. 
C2a. Recipient location 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 employment weeks 
(conditionala) 
weekly hours 
(conditionala) 
total hours 
(unconditionala) 
 IV IV IV IV 
Recipient location     
Contract spending/capt-1 
(1,000$) 
0.00323** 0.0501 0.139*** 12.09** 
 (0.00130) (0.0429) (0.0450) (4.695) 
     
Kleibergen-Paap LM  27.29 27.29 27.29 27.29 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value Wu Hausman 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.01 
Cost per job ($1,000 US) 499.6 1521 487.1 148.8 
s.e. ($1,000 US) 200.7 1301 157.5 57.79 
Observations 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 
state-year FE Yes Yes Yes yes 
metropolitan FE Yes Yes Yes yes 
     
C2b. Location of the activity 
 employment weeks 
(conditionala) 
weekly hours 
(conditionala) 
total hours 
(unconditionala) 
 IV IV IV IV 
Location of the activity     
Contract spending/capt-1 
($1,000) 
0.00653** 0.225** 0.209* 27.60** 
 (0.00310) (0.113) (0.119) (13.22) 
     
Kleibergen-Paap LM  6.203 6.203 6.203 6.203 
p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
p-value Wu Hausman 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Cost per job ($1,000 US) 246.9 338.8 324.9 65.23 
s.e. ($1,000 US) 117.1 170.4 185.3 31.25 
Observations 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 
state-year FE yes yes yes yes 
metropolitan FE yes yes yes yes 
Regressions weighted according to the location’s population. Kleibergen-Paap LM is the Lagrange multiplier 
test. Wu-Hausman p-value is the p-value of the heteroscedasticity-robust test for exogeneity of the spending 
measure (the null is exogeneity). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a 
(Un)conditional on already in employment. 
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Appendix D  
Local government responses  
Local governments may adjust their own expenditure decisions if a firm in their city receives 
a federal contract. Federal expenditure may be used as a substitute for certain types of local 
government expenditure, or local governments may facilitate the contracted activities. The 
response of local governments is important for identification: local government spending 
might form an unobserved variable that correlates to contract expenditure as well as GDP.  
To address this concern, we examine local government spending responses to the awarding of 
a federal contract. We use the Historical Finance database for county governments from the 
Census, which runs up to 2012. We aggregate the local government expenditure of counties 
in each micro/metropolitan area. There is a slight difference in the coverage of the counties in 
the Historical Finance database and the areas for which we have Census information on GDP. 
We report regressions on all identified areas from the Historical Finance database, as well as 
the subsample of cities that appears in both datasets. 
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Table D1. Effects on county government current expenditure per capita (2005-2012). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 County 
expenditure per 
cap 
 
County 
expenditure per 
cap 
 
County 
expenditure per 
cap 
 
County 
expenditure 
per cap 
 
County 
expenditure per 
cap 
 
    IV IV 
Recipient 
location 
     
Contract 
spending/capt-1  
0.0265*** 0.0381***  0.0303**  
 (0.00708) (0.00862)  (0.0119)  
Location of the 
activity 
     
Contract 
spending/capt-1  
  0.00149  0.0292 
   (0.00808)  (0.06161) 
      
Kleibergen-Paap 
LM  
   17.91 4.02 
p-value    0.00 0.04 
Observations 3,880 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 
state-year FE no no no yes yes 
metropolitan FE no no no yes yes 
Regressions weighted according to the location’s population. Kleibergen-Paap LM is the Lagrange multiplier 
test. Wu-Hausman p-value is the p-value of the heteroscedasticity-robust test for exogeneity of the spending 
measure (the null is exogeneity). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table D1 reports the results of resorting to the methodology with local government 
expenditure as an outcome. The OLS regression of Column 1 suggests that each dollar linked 
to a federal contract at recipient location increases county-level expenditure by less than 3 
cents. In the sample of our baseline analysis, it is under 4 cents (Column 2), and insignificant 
when examining expenditure at the location of performance. Applying instrumentation and 
fixed effects, we find an accommodation of 3 cents for every dollar (recipient location, 
Column 4) and insignificant results for dollars at the location of activity (Column 5). Overall, 
the response of county government current expenditure to local federal contracting is limited, 
and the confounding effects of local government expenditure seem minor. 
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Appendix E 
Figure E1. Moran’s I plot for Contract Expenditure per capita based on location of recipient 
(main sample) 
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Appendix F 
Table F1. Correlation matrix for the Bartik (shift-share)  
 Instrument 
local 
Instrument 
0-200km 
Instrument 
200-400km 
Instrument 
400-600km 
Instrument local 1    
     
Instrument 0-200km 0.0417 1   
 (0.0406)    
Instrument 200-400km -0.0089 0.1907 1  
 (0.0272) (0.0000)   
Instrument 400-600km 0.0045 0.0844 0.2468 1 
 (0.6793) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Note: Based on the baseline sample of 3,015 observations. p-value in parentheses.  
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Appendix G 
Table G1. Seemingly unrelated regression for shift-share (Bartik) instruments with Spending 
measures as dependent variables   
Panel a: Expenditure rings based on location of vendor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Dependent variable Spending/cap Spending Spending Spending  
Range  0-200km 200-400km 400-600km 
Location measure vendor vendor vendor vendor 
Location of Vendor     
IV per capita spending  0.07*** -3,564.61 5,470.09 2,866.97 
 (0.00) (4,310.61) (7,128.30) (7,768.91) 
 62.64 -0.83 0.77 0.37 
Instrument 0-200km  -0.00 0.04*** 0.01*** -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 -1.40 107.01 7.98 -1.78 
Instrument 200-400km  -0.00 0.00*** 0.04*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 -0.37 7.15 103.12 4.95 
Instrument 400-600km  0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 0.34 1.09 5.97 103.70 
     
Observations 3,015 3,015 3,015 3,015 
Standard errors in parentheses; t-statistics in bold. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table G1 shows a seemingly unrelated regression. The regression shows what instruments 
predict which spending measure (the endogenous variables in Table 5), while controlling for 
potentially correlated error structures. The numbers in bold show the t-statistics, as the 
standard errors are typically low.  
The t-statistics in Table G1 show that the instrument for every ring predicts it spending 
measure well. That holds, conditional on adding the other instruments. Furthermore, based on 
the t-statistics, the relevant instrument seems to be the dominant explanatory variable – for 
instance, column 2 shows that the instrument for the 0-200km range has a t-statistics of over 
100, while the other instruments have a t-statistics smaller than 10.  
